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Martin Feldstein, James R. Hines, Jr., 
and R. Glenn Hubbard 
This growing worldwide importance of international business activities has in 
recent years lead to serious reexaminations of the ways that governments tax 
multinational corporations. In the United States, much of the debate concerns 
the competitive positions of  U.S. firms in international product and capital 
markets. In addition, there are those who argue that U.S. international tax rules 
have become more complex and more distorting in recent years, particularly 
since the passage of  the Tax  Reform Act of  1986. Discussions in the U.S. 
Congress and the administration since 1992 reveal a willingness to consider 
significant reforms. In  Europe, increased liberalization of  capital markets 
prompted' the European Commission to discuss harmonization of  corporate 
taxation. These policy developments not only suggest dissatisfaction with cer- 
tain features of modem tax practice, but also raise deeper questions of whether 
current systems of taxing international income are viable in a world of signifi- 
cant capital market integration and global commercial competition. 
Academic researchers have expressed renewed interest in  studying the ef- 
fects of  taxation on capital formation and allocation, patterns of  finance in 
multinational companies, international competition, and opportunities for in- 
come shifting and tax avoidance. This research brings together the approaches 
used by  specialists in public finance and international economics. The papers 
presented in this volume summarize the results of  a research program of the 
National Bureau of Economic Research on the effects of taxation on the invest- 
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ment and financing decisions of multinational corporations.' As a group, the 
papers describe the impact of U.S. firms' outbound foreign investment on the 
U.S. and foreign economies. The papers offer empirical evidence documenting 
channels through which tax policy in the United States and abroad affects plant 
and equipment investment, spending on R&D, the cost of debt and equity fi- 
nance, and dividend repatriations by U.S. subsidiaries. The findings of these 
papers, described briefly below, will be useful in discussions of  reforms of 
international tax rules in the United States and elsewhere. The current U.S. 
rules for taxing international income are summarized in an appendix at the end 
of the volume. 
According to Robert Lipsey, overseas production contributes to the ability 
of American multinationals to retain world market shares in the face of a long- 
term decline in the U.S. share of  world trade, and in the face of short-term 
changes (such as exchange rate fluctuations). Overseas production performs 
the same functions for Swedish firms and, more recently, for Japanese firms. 
Within U.S. multinationals, those with higher shares of  production overseas 
have higher employment at home relative to production at home. Foreign pro- 
duction appears to require larger numbers of employees in headquarters activi- 
ties (including R&D and supervision). 
Martin Feldstein shows that the credit for foreign taxes paid does not induce 
U.S. firms to expand their foreign direct investment (FDI) enough so that the 
return on FDI to the United States is less than the return on the displaced 
domestic investment. Feldstein argues that a typical marginal investment over- 
seas (which has the same net return to an American multinational parent as an 
alterqative marginal domestic investment) actually generates a higher return 
for the United States than would the domestic investment it displaces. In order 
to maximize the present value of U.S. national income, one would not replace 
the current foreign tax credit with a deduction for foreign taxes. Instead, one 
would move in the opposite direction, encouraging more FDI in general, and 
investments that employ substantial foreign debt per dollar of U.S. capital in 
particular. 
Joosung Jun modifies conventional cost-of-capital measures to incorporate 
the impact of international tax rules. He finds that corporate taxation of foreign 
investment causes U.S. firms operating in major foreign markets to face, on 
average, about 20 percent higher costs of capital than do domestic firms in the 
United States. Further, U.S. firms very likely face higher costs of capital than 
do local firms in foreign markets. U.S. firms operating in foreign markets also 
may have cost-of-capital disadvantages vis-A-vis firms from third countries, in 
part because the U.S. tax system is not integrated and in part because U.S. tax 
deferral and foreign tax credit calculation rules are so strict. 
1. More-technical papers appear in the companion volume edited by Feldstein, Hines, and Hub- 
bard (1995) and in earlier volumes edited by Razin and Slemrod (1990) and Giovannini, Hubbard, 
and Slemrod (1993). 3  Introduction 
Roger Gordon and Jeffrey MacKie-Mason examine possible explanations of 
why  industrial countries tax  the overseas income of  their domestic multi- 
national firms in the ways that they do. Many economists argue that it is ineffi- 
cient to use corporate income taxes to raise revenue in open economies. If 
capital is internationally mobile, the burden of corporate taxes falls largely on 
other immobile factors (such as labor), and the tax system would be more effi- 
cient if  these other factors were instead taxed directly. Not only do govern- 
ments use corporate taxes, however, but corporate tax rates are also roughly 
comparable with top individual tax rates. Some theories predict that multi- 
nationals based in countries with residence-based tax systems should not invest 
in countries with low corporate tax rates, since those multinationals must pay 
sizable surtaxes when they repatriate their profits. This tax obligation imposes 
on these multinationals a competitive disadvantage, yet there is a significant 
amount of such FDI. Gordon and MacKie-Mason suggest that the abilities of 
firms to shift income (through aggressive transfer pricing) may explain the use 
of  corporate income taxes, as well as the observed pattern of FDI. Countries 
may use corporate taxes as backstops to labor income taxes in order to discour- 
age individuals from converting their labor incomes into othenvise-untaxed 
corporate income. The authors explore how those taxes might be modified to 
deal with cross-border income shifting. 
Andrew Lyon and Gerald Silverstein examine some of the ways that U.S.- 
based multinational corporations may be affected by the corporate alternative 
minimum tax (AMT). In 1990, more than half of all the foreign-source income 
was earned by corporations subject to the AMT. Consequently, when U.S. firms 
plan their foreign activities, the tax incentives created by the AMT may be at 
least as important as those created by the regular U.S. corporate tax. The AMT 
creates  a  relative  incentive for  AMT  firms  to  invest  abroad  rather  than 
in  the United States, and the AMT offers a temporary timing  opportunity 
that allows repatriation of income from abroad at a lower cost than if the firm 
were subject to the rules of  the regular U.S. tax system. These two different 
incentives have an ambiguous effect on U.S. domestic investment overall, if 
repatriated income is retained by  the parent corporation in the United States. 
The AMT may provide an opportunity for firms to repatriate income from cer- 
tain foreign locations with poor reinvestment opportunities, and at the same 
time to reinvest funds abroad in alternative foreign locations that have bet- 
ter  investment opportunities. There appears to be  an ambiguous net  effect 
of  these two incentives on the total volume of  capital invested outside the 
United States. 
James Hines asks first whether R&D activity by multinational firms is sensi- 
tive to local tax conditions, and second whether imported technology and R&D 
are complements or substitutes. He finds that R&D responds to local tax rates, 
and that it is a substitute for imported technology. Firms appear to react to high 
royalty tax rates by  paying fewer royalties and performing additional R&D 
locally. To  the extent that royalty payments reflect actual technology transfer 4  Martin Feldstein, James R. Hines, Jr., and R. Glenn Hubbard 
(rather than adept accounting practices), the behavior of  multinational firms 
suggests that local R&D is a substitute for imported technology. 
Rosanne Altshuler, Scott Newlon, and William Randolph recognize that re- 
patriation taxes on dividends may vary over time, providing firms with incen- 
tives to time repatriations so that they occur in years when repatriation tax rates 
are relatively low. The authors use information about cross-country differences 
in tax rates to distinguish the effects on dividend repatriations  of permanent tax 
changes (as typically occur when statutory  tax rates change) from the effects of 
transitory tax changes. Using data from U.S. tax returns for a large sample of 
U.S.  corporations and their foreign subsidiaries, the authors find that perma- 
nent tax changes have much smaller effects than do the transitory tax changes. 
This finding suggests that repatriation taxes do affect dividend repatriation de- 
cisions, but only to the extent that taxes vary over time. 
Jason Cummins and R. Glenn Hubbard use panel data on FDI by subsidiar- 
ies of U.S. multinational firms to measure the effect of taxation on FDI. The 
results cast significant doubt on the simplest notion that taxes do not influence 
U.S. firms’ overseas investment decisions. Taxes appear to influence FDI  in 
precisely the ways  indicated by traditional neoclassical economic models of 
investment behavior. Specifically, it appears that the annual rate of  overseas 
investment falls by  1-2  percentage points for each percentage point rise in the 
cost of capital for outbound FDI. This effect, which is of a magnitude similar to 
those recently estimated for domestic investment by U.S. and European firms, 
implies that changes in foreign corporate tax rates and depreciation rules, or 
in the foreign tax credit status of parent firms, significantly influence overseas 
investment by U.S. subsidiaries. 
Kenneth Froot and James Hines examine the impact of  the change in the 
U.S. interest allocation rules that followed passage of the Tax Reform Act of 
1986. The 1986 act significantly limited the tax deductibility of the U.S. inter- 
est expenses of certain American multinational corporations.  This tax change 
increased the tax liabilities of certain American multinationals and made addi- 
tional borrowing more expensive for these firms. Froot and Hines find that the 
change in  interest allocation rules discouraged borrowing and  new  invest- 
ments. Firms that were unable to deduct all of their interest expenses against 
their U.S. tax liabilities issued 4.2 percent less debt (measured as a fraction of 
total firm assets) and invested 3.5 percent less in property, plant, and equipment 
during 1986-91  than other firms did. This is consistent with other evidence 
that suggests that the Tax  Reform Act  of  1986 significantly raised the bor- 
rowing costs of some American multinational firms. 
Jason Cummins, Trevor Harris, and Kevin Hassett analyze the two account- 
ing regimes that govern reporting practices in most developed countries. “One- 
book” countries, such as Germany, use their tax books as the basis for financial 
reporting. “Two-book” countries, including the United States, keep tax and 
financial reporting books largely separate. Firms in one-book countries may be 
reluctant to claim certain tax benefits if reductions in their taxable incomes can 5  Introduction 
be misinterpreted by  financial market participants as signals of  lower profit- 
ability. The authors’ estimates suggest that the interaction of tax systems and 
accounting  regimes significantly influences domestic investment patterns, both 
within and across countries. 
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